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BOOK REVIEW
By Ronald Dworkin.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. Pp. xv, 293. $12.00.
2
Reviewed by Alan Mabe
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY.

Ronald Dworkin is one of the two or three most innovative contemporary legal philosophers. After several centuries of debate between proponents of legal positivism and natural law theory, we
may now have a genuine alternative that defies classification in
either of those traditional categories. Taking Rights Seriously is a
collection of eleven previously published essays and two new essays
written especially for this volume. While all the major components
of Dworkin's position are now available in a single work, they are
not systematically unified in this reprint format. For the present the
reader must perform the task of synthesis, though Dworkin has
indicated that he will make a systematic presentation of his position
in the future.
The central idea of Dworkin's philosophy is the rights thesis:
"[Jiudicial decisions enforce existing political rights." '3 One might
add that this is so even in hard cases at law where competent lawyers disagree about what the outcome of the case should be. Dworkin also maintains that there is no judicial discretion and that there
is a single right answer in every case.
Dworkin is attempting to provide a systematic alternative to legal
positivism, which he describes as the ruling theory of law. In particular, he attacks H.L.A. Hart's version of legal positivism as articulated in The Concept of Law.4 Dworkin dubs positivism "the model
of rules." According to the model of rules, there is a master rule
(Hart's rule of recognition) which allows one to determine which
rules of the legal system are valid. Because of the positivist's insistence on the separation of law and morality, the determination of
the validity of law is primarily a factual matter: whether the particular rule meets the conditions of the master rule of recognition. One
has legal rights and obligations when there are legal rules which
provide them. If there are no legal rules available for a case, or if
the available rules are inconsistent or vague, the judge will not have
1. Professor of Jurisprudence and Fellow at University College, Oxford University. B.A.,
Harvard University, 1953; B.A., Oxford University, 1955; LL.B., Harvard University, 1957.
2. Associate Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University.
3. R. DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIousLY 87 (1977).
4. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAW (1961).
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adequate legal standards for deciding the case. According to the
model of rules, the law has "run out" at this point and the judge
has discretion to find extralegal material on which to base the decision. When the law runs out, there is inadequate legal material for
determining a single right answer, so many answers would be legally
acceptable.
Dworkin rejects this model. He argues in effect that the law never
runs out. Dworkin argues that the law is more than a set of rules.
In his early work he emphasized the role of principles in the law. If
one has principles in addition to rules, the law cannot run out; hence
there can be no judicial discretion. 5 Dworkin recognizes that the
introduction of principles is not in itself adequate to counter the
model of rules. In later essays, especially "Hard Cases," 6 he develops a more elaborate theory of law. He introduces a mythical judge,
Hercules. Hercules is to construct a set of principles that best explain and justify existing law. This theory will include a theory of
the constitution, a theory of legislation, and a theory of precedent.
In order to develop a consistent theory, a theory of mistakes must
be included. In effect, then, Hercules is to construct a set of principles that fits the institutional material (constitution, statutes, and
precedents). If more than one theory fits the institutional material,
Hercules is to choose the one that most appeals to our theory of
morality.
Presumably Hercules will arrive at a theory (set of principles)
that can be used to decide the hardest case. This theory will be the
basis for deciding whose rights are to prevail in a given case. As
Dworkin puts it, "A proposition of law may be asserted as true if it
is more consistent with the theory of law that best justifies settled
law than the contrary proposition of law." 7 A typical proposition of
law would be: "Plaintiff has the right he claimed before the court."
Dworkin's elaborate theory fills in the gap found in the model of
rules and. eliminates judicial discretion, since there is available a
legal standard which Hercules can use to decide hard cases.
Effectively, Dworkin argues that the determination of what is the
law is a normative matter, in contrast to the positivists who consider
this determination a factual matter. Dworkin believes that "judges
must sometimes make judgments of political morality in order to
decide what the legal rights of litigants are."' In working out his
5.
sion.
6.
7.
8.

Dworkin defines discretion as there being no standards available for guiding the deciThe Model of Rules I, in R. DwomuN, supra note 3, at 32.
Hard Cases, id. at 81-130.
Can Rights Be Controversial?, id. at 283.
Hard Cases, id. at 90.
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theory of law, Hercules must include moral concerns in the determination of the standard to be used to settle a case. Dworkin wants to
avoid use of the idiosyncratic values of a particular judge, so he
would apparently follow Rawls' method for establishing the moral
principles Hercules would use in constructing his theory of law. This
method involves constructing the set of moral principles that best
explain and justify the considered moral judgments that would be
assented to by those subject to the law. This part of Dworkin's
position is very controversial and is inadequately developed, but his
position offers an alternative to legal positivism that seems to stop
short of traditional forms of natural law theory.
With the aid of Hercules' theory, one can explicate the rights
thesis: "Judicial decisions enforce existing political rights." Political morality enters into the determination of the standards to be
used in deciding whose rights are to prevail in a hard case, so one
cannot determine in any neutral or factual way what legal rights one
has. Contrary to the positivist view that rights are simply created
in hard cases, Dworkin argues that even in hard cases rights exist
for us to discover, in the sense that the constructed theory of law
will merely sanction the preexisting rights of one of the parties in
the case. Dworkin thinks there is always a single right answer, since
there is always a best theory of law that can serve as the standard
for determining the answer-even though the answer may be controversial and judges may make mistakes.
Dworkin gives some attention to working out a critical theory of
rights. The fundamental right he articulates is the right to equal
concern and respect. He distinguishes between the right to equal
treatment and the right to be treated as an equal. The right to equal
treatment entails the equal distribution of goods and opportunities,
whereas the right to be treated as an equal guarantees equal concern
and respect in the political decision about how those goods and
opportunities are to be distributed. The latter is the more fundamental and is compatible with unequal treatment. This distinction
is the basis for Dworkin's support of preferential treatment and for
his argument that Allan Bakke has no right that the Supreme
Court should vindicate.
Dworkin's substantive theory of rights needs far more work before
it can reasonably be evaluated. Dworkin's moral theory and his
theory of rights are anti-utilitarian. That is, rights function to limit
interference with one's activities even when the social good would
be served by such interference. The problem is that Dworkin does
9.

Dworkin, Why Bakke Has No Case, THE N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Nov. 10, 1977, at 11.
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not provide a rich enough account for us to understand how his
theory of rights would differ from rule-utilitarianism.
Dworkin has devoted much attention to the role and justification
of the judicial function. He distinguishes between principles and
policies and maintains that judicial decisions should be generated
by principles rather than by policies. Given the widespread belief
that judges legislate, or, more particularly, that they make policy
determinations in their decisionmaking, Dworkin's claim may seem
quite radical. But because he argues that the rights thesis and a
principled basis for decisions are compatible with both consequentialist reasoning and discussion of the issues in economic terms, the
theory ultimately is not very radical. Counterarguments to Dworkin's theory must be framed very carefully if they are to be effective.
Dworkin distinguishes between arguments of policy and arguments of principle. An argument of policy justifies a political decision "by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the community as a whole."' 10 An argument of principle
justifies a political decision "by showing that the decision respects
or secures some individual or group right."" According to Dworkin,
arguments of policy are most appropriate in the legislature: judges
should limit their reflection to arguments of principle in articulating
the rights of litigants. Legislative policy decisions create institutional rights which, of course, a court may enforce. But to secure a
right based on a legislative policy does not mean that the court's
decision is a policy decision. Dworkin suggests in a recent article
that a true counterexample to the rights thesis would require a case
in which a court determined that one litigant had the right to win,
but as a matter of policy decided to award the decision to his opponent." Dworkin concedes that many cases are compatible with either an argument-of-principle reading or an argument-of-policy
reading. However, Dworkin sees the compatibility of both types of
arguments with the cases as something of a victory for him, since
so many of his critics adopt the policy reading as obvious.
Dworkin uses his reflection on the role of principle to defend an
active role for the judiciary. Opponents of judicial activism argue
that it is undemocratic, since unelected judges make decisions that
should be made by the majority-decision process. Dworkin argues
that the distinctive function of the court is countermajoritarian and
anti-utilitarian. Its role is to decide what people's rights are, which
rights may often be against the interests of the majority. So long as
10.
11.
12.

R. DwORKIN, supra note 3, at 82.
Id.
Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REv. 1201 (1977).
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judges limit themselves to arguments of principle, they are not
super legislators and hence are not usurping anyone else's function.
But if judges engage in policymaking, a legitimate counterdemocracy argument may be made against them. Dworkin's account,
then, is both a defense of judicial activism and a theory of the limits
of judicial decisionmaking.
Perhaps the most controversial part of Dworkin's theory is the role
of political morality in the determination of legal rights. Even
though Dworkin has shown how Hercules might construct a legal
theory which eliminates any judicial discretion arising from the
absence of standards relevant to the decision, a critic might argue
that there is enough uncertainty at the level of legal theory and at
the level of moral theory for us to call these standards into question.
So one might say there is judicial discretion at the level of legal
theory or moral theory or both. Dworkin admits there will be controversy over his theory, and he never claims that there is any certain
way to determine the right answer in a case even though there is one.
But even accepting this reservation, critics may claim that Dworkin's model is so indeterminate that little judicial discretion is actually foreclosed. However, given the available institutional material (constitution, statutes, precedents), one could, it seems, give a
rather determinate account of some legal principles which would
best justify existing law.
Perhaps the problem comes ultimately at the level of moral
theory. Dworkin would counter an attack at this level by arguing
that morality for the purposes of the law is not so amorphous. He
says that "his [Hercules'] theory identifies a particular conception
of community morality as decisive of legal issues; that conception
holds that community morality is the political morality presupposed by the laws and institutions of the community."'" Dworkin
would argue that the morality presupposed by legal and other institutions of society can be determined, so that in principle we can
have closure even for the moral standard.
This issue in Dworkin's model is far from settled, but it appears
that he has made a valuable contribution to legal theory in structuring the issue as he has. Other American legal theorists have addressed this problem, but none has been able to focus the issue as
sharply as Dworkin. Holmes reflected on the role of values in judges'
decisions, and Fuller has labored to show the role of rationality and
values in judicial decisionmaking, but neither seems to offer any
determinate theory, either explanatory or justificatory. A theory
13.

R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 126.
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that would explain how moral values get into the law and would give
an account of the appropriate role moral values are to play in judicial decisionmaking would be a valuable contribution to legal philosophy. Even if Dworkin is not entirely successful, he has made
more headway with this problem than any other contemporary legal
philosopher.
Much more detail is in Dworkin's essays than I have been able to
communicate here, and many other controversial and important
issues are discussed in these essays. One thing is clear: Dworkin will
have as much influence on legal philosophy in the next decade as
Hart had in the last one. At the very least, anyone interested in
contemporary legal philosophy must encounter and assess Ronald
Dworkin's views.

